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THREE MODELS OF SOCIAL ORDER - OR FOUR?
Ask a contemporary social scientist the question: "How is social order 
possible?" and she or he will likely answer— if at all— with a model. Ho one 
can possibly observe directly or comprehend totally how such an enormous 
multitude of independent actors with diverse motives can interact in so many 
different and changing ways, and yet somehow manage to produce (or better, 
reproduce) something approaching "order". Even to begin to grasp how 
something so incredibly corrplex works requires a feat of great intellectual 
pretension and radical analytical simplification. Previously, this could be 
attempted with organic metaphors or mechanistic analogies; today we feel 
compelled to offer more explicit and complex "models of society" or "social 
order". These abstractions reduce the variety of actors to a few ideal types, 
assign to them a restricted menu of passions or interests, allow them to 
cooperate and conflict with each other according to certain patterns or rules, 
and postulate that all this interaction will result in something called "an 
equilibrium"— a state in which the actual behaviour of persons and 
collectivities is both mutually adjusted and predictably variable. Moreover, 
such models usually pretend not merely to be empirically correct, but also to 
be nonnatively proper, i.e. they postulate that if societies were indeed 
ordered in the stipulated manner, beneficial results would ensue for most, if 
not all, of their members who would, therefore, accept such an arrangement as 
natural and legitimate.
Given the magnitude of the intellectural task involved, it is not 
surprising that there are few such general models available. Three of them 
seem to have virtually dominated philosophical speculation and social science 
thought. They tend to be identified by the central institution which embodies 
(and enforces) their respective and distinctive guiding principles: the 





























































































be more accurate to label them according to the principles themselves: 
spontaneous solidarity, dispersed competition and hierarchical control. 
Clearly, however dominant any one of these three may have been at a given 
moment and/or for a given set of actors, almost everyone would concede that 
modem societies/polities/economies can only be analyzed in terms of some mix 
of them. Today, social scientists in their separate disciplines seem to be 
groping toward concepts for identifying these multifaceted combinations and 
interactions. While some point out the conflicts and incompatibilities 
between the three ordering principles; others emphasize their mutual 
complementarities. Thus, communities may undermine markets by facilitating 
informal collusion and supporting clientelistic arrangements; whereas market 
competition may decorrpose corrmunity bonds and erode common value orientations. 
But it is also true that communities encourage mutual confidence and "good 
faith" which are necessary for stable economic exchange, while markets 
provide communities with opportunities for "extended reproduction". 
Similarly, state intervention may distort markets, just as the outcome of free 
contracts and competition may contradict state policies. At the same time, 
markets require a legal framework and the authoritative enforcement of 
contracts, and even the most etatistic states seem to require markets as a 
supplementary mechanism of allocation. Finally, there are a number of ways in 
which communities may suffer disintegration as a result of state growth and 
government intervention, just as communitarian "tribalism" can frustrate the 
development of a oUible nation-state. Nevertheless, a state without some kind 
of spontaneous solidarity among its citizens is no more than a bureaucratic or 
military conspiracy, and modem communities without a state would always be in 
danger of losing their identity and independence.
This paper will not explore further the relationships, the linkages and 
the proper balance between community, market and state. While we agree that 




























































































different modes of coordination that the answer to the question of social 
order is to be found, we suggest that there exists, in advanced 
industrial/capitalist societies, a distinctive fourth institutional basis of 
order which is more than a transient and expedient amalgam of the three others 
and, hence, capable of making a lasting and autonomous contribution to 
rendering the behavior of social actors reciprocally adjustive and 
predictable. If we labeled this additional source of social order after its 
embodying institution, we would call it "the Association" (1)— in contrast to 
"the Conrnunity", "the Market" and "the State". If we were to identify it by 
its guiding principle of interaction and allocation, we would call it 
"organizational concertation"— in contrast to "spontaneous solidarity", 
"dispersed conpetilion" and "hierarchical coordination".
Wliy assign to associations such an elevated theoretical status, coequal 
to conrnunity, market and state? The background of our argument is the 
emergence in Western societies of systems of bargained interest accomodation 
and policy concertation in the 1960s and 1970s (Berger 1981, Crouch and 
Pizzomo 1978, Goldthorpe forthcoming, Lehmbruch and Schmitter 1982, Schmitter 
and Lehmbruch 1979). Ch the basis of accumulated research, we are now 
convinced that the logic according to which these systems operate cannot be 
reduced to the respective logics of community, market and state, or explained 
by ad hoc mixes of these (2). Che purpose of this paper is to explore this 
"fourth" logic more systematically and to show in what sense it is different 
frorn the others. We believe that it is only through an explicit recognition 
of the specific contribution of associations and organized concertation to 
social order, that we can arrive at a better understanding of today's 
"bargained" economies and societies. We also believe that an improved 
understanding of the actual and potential role of associations may 
significantly increase the range of strategic alternatives for the solution of 



























































































associations are of different importance in different countries, sectors and 
policy areas, but as the same applies no less to the three other ordering 
principles, we do not think that this, by itself, speaks against our argument.
The idea that associations may provide a distinctive basis for social 
order is, of course, not entirely new, and we will call upon some prominent 
witnesses further on. Nevertheless, by the mainstream of modem social and 
political thought, associations have always been regarded much more as a 
source of disorder. Usually the history of democratic/industrialized 
societies is presented as consisting of two main periods: the expansion of 
markets into pre-existing communities in the nineteenth century, and the 
expansion of the interventionist state into the new market economy in the 
twentieth century. Associations were in both periods regarded with suspicion: 
in the first one, they were seen as impediments to the development of a free 
market; in the second one, they were viewed as obstacles to the gixowth of the 
(democratic) state— a perception that was reinforced by the authoritarian 
corporatist experiences of some countries in the interwar years. In spite of 
historical evidence to the contrary and occasional theoretical dissent, this 
tendency to discuss associations mainly in terms of their actual or potential 
dysfunctions for the three other, more established bases of order has 
continued to dominate the scene.
In part, this may be explained by the fact that community, market and 
state all have their specialized professional advocates within the social 
.•sciences, while associations typically had to put up with individual 
dissidents from a variety of disciplines. Thus, sociologists, following the 
forceful lead of Robert Michels, have been relentless in demonstrating that 
modem interest associations tend to become "alienated" from the values of the 
communities they purport to represent. Similarly, economists— as far as we 
know, without exception— have treated associations as cartels, and associative 





























































































Finally, political scientists and public lawyers have, in their great 
majority, regarded associations as a threat to liberal democracy, 
parliamentary rule and state sovereignty, pointing to phenomena such as 
industrial action in defiance of legislation, "colonization" of state 
regulatory agencies, or the undermining of parliamentary sovereignty by 
"social pacts" negotiated between the government and strong interest groups.
Cur point is not that these observations are entirely mistaken. What we 
are saying, however, is that they are one-sided. The fact that associative 
action may be dysfunctional for the three (other) institutional bases of 
social order— a fact that we by no means wish to contest— does by itself not 
rule out the possibility that it may also contribute to order. As we have 
seen, community, market and state have dysfunctions for each other as well. 
What is important is that they at the same time require one another for- their 
respective functioning; and that then? are specific problems of order that 
each of them is better equipped to resolve than the others. 'Ihe same, we 
submit, can be said of associations.
A BRI El' EXCURSUS ON COMMUNITY, MARKET AND STATE
Ihe dominant models of social order are so well known— even if their 
guiding principles are not often rendered explicit— that ve can pass over them 
quickly. Each of them has its own postulated integrity, autonomy and tendency 
towards equilibrium and reproductivity. Each lias distinctive properties and 
processes, and each corresponds to distinctive aspects of the human condition. 
In Table I we have laid out schematically twelve elements which might be said 
to corrprise any corrprehensive, if radically sinrplified, understanding of 
social order, and then suggested the different "answers" which the three 





























































































































































































































extensively to explain the structure, not only of the conpetitive allocation 
of material goods and services according to consumer preferences in a 
capitalist economy, but also of the conpetitive interaction between political 
parties in pursuit of voter preferences in democratic elections, we have split 
this colurm into two parallel sub-routines for the economic and the political 
market.
At the core of the different assumptions about actors, conditions, 
means, resources, decision rules, lines of cleavage, types of goods and 
normative-legal foundations lie the central and controversial questions of 
what motivates super- and subordinate individuals to engage in social action 
and what makes them respect and accept the collective outcomes which ensue 
from their efforts at obtaining their specific satisfactions. In the ideal 
community, chiefs, notables, leaders, etc., desire the esteem of their 
followers, while the latter seek a sense of belonging to and participating in 
the group as such. Together they satisfy their mutual needs for a shared 
affective existence and a distinctive collective identity. In the perfect 
economic/electoral market, economic/political entrepreneurs seek to maximize 
their profits/electoral support in exchange for which their consumers/voters 
are expected to be content with the material benefits arising from 
competition/the inpact on public policy of electoral "voice". The
arrangement is legitimated by greater than otherwise obtainable economic 
prosperity of consuming publics and political accountability of governing 
elites. Finally, in the Ideal-typical state bureaucracy, allocational 
decisions are made through "public policies" that are enforced, with the 
ultimate backing of the state's monopoly on legitimate coercion, by civil 
servants striving to satisfy their dominant interest in career advancement and 
bureaucratic stability, on subjects that strive to avoid punishment; both do 
so by minimizing risks and maximizing predictability through following agreed- 





























































































protecting all actors from domination by external actors and in affording 
equitable and predictable treatment to all.
None of these orders is intrinsically harmonious or conflict-free. All 
have errbedded in them an axial line of cleavage which is a source of continual 
tension, as well as numerous other cleavages which may arise more
episodically. Corrmunities have the general problem of dealing with the
relations between native members and "foreigners" who have somehow gotten into 
their midst or who wish to do so; economic markets have to deal with the basic 
conflict of interest between sellers and buyers (of products as well as of 
factors of production, e.g. capital and labor), just as political markets must 
cope with the conflicting claims of parties and voters; states are divided by 
the perpetual dispute over the privileges which rulers arrogate to themselves 
and the obligations which they impose on the ruled. Presumably, however, 
these lines of cleavage are at least containable, if not resolvable, as long 
as each order applies and respects its own decision rules. Corrmunities may by 
conmon consent incorporate foreigners within their ranks— if properly 
socialized— or they may cxpell them if they behave improperly. Markets for 
goods and services, by responding through investment to the preferences of 
consumers, may provide for a Pareto-optimal allocation of resources that gives 
all participants the maximum possible satisfaction, or for sufficient pay-offs 
to induce workers and consumers to accept the property rights of capitalists 
and producers. In the electoral market-place, majoritarian winners may gain 
the contingent consent of minoritarian losers by assuring them that future 
contests will be fairly conducted and could result in a reversal of fortune in 
office-holding and policy-making. States can effectively mitigate the 
tensions between rulers and ruled by following recognized procedures in 
establishing entitlements to positions and benefits and by adjudicating fairly 




























































































The main threats to the integrity, persistence and legitimacy of these 
three orders are not likely to come from within but from without. The 
sharpest and most potentially destructive conflicts are generated when the 
principles, actors, media of exchange, resources, motives, decision rules, and 
lines of cleavage from the different "orders" compete with each other for the 
allegiance of specific groups, for the control of scarce resources, for the 
incorporation of new issues, for the definition of rules regulating exchanges 
between them, and so forth. Politics with, or within, the respective orders 
is one thing; politics between them quite another matter.
Nor can such dramatic and uncertain conflicts be avoided. Under the 
conditions described generically as "modernity", the three orders of 
coinnunity, market and state have come to depend upon each other and to be 
affected increasingly by each other's unresolved problems and externalities. 
Conmunities without states did exist in the past, but there are few left, just 
as it is hard to imagine even the most isolated or self-encapsulated conrnunity 
which does not draw some of its resources from commercialized economic 
exchanges. As innumerable analysts have pointed out, capitalist market 
relations would be self-destructive without the persistence of some degree of 
trust, deference, esteem and consent rooted in communitarian practices, and 
they could not even exist if public authority were not present to ensure the 
policing of contracts— not to mention the myriad of other facilities that the 
modem state places at the disposition of producers and consumers, capitalists 
and workers. Even the most ideal-typical bureaucratic state, whatever its 
linkage with an open, conpetitive party system and electoral marketplace, must 
depend upon the performance of "its" economy (and increasingly that of other 
economies) to generate the financial resources necessary for protecting its 
"legitimate control over the means of coercion" and for remunerating those who 
occupy its positions of inperative coordination and authoritative allocation. 




























































































the efficacy of its everyday decisions depends to a substantial extent on the 
voluntary conpliance and socialized identification of its subjects who 
associate it with a particular nation, ethnic group, religion or "corrmunity of 
fate". Especially in moments of crisis which call for exceptional effort and 
sacrifice, states will find themselves drawing heavily on their "community 
account", as well as upon their economic resources and plebiscitary support.
So, to an increasing extent, modem societies find themselves i rime shed in the 
interstices between the three "orders". After lamenting "the decline of 
community", attention was focused on "the politicization and bureaucratic 
regulation of the economy". More recently, we have become aware of the 
"limits of state power" when confronted with market adjustments and 
corrinunitarian identities. One way in which these "irrmeshed" societies have 
been coping with this situation is by generating an increasing variety and 
number of institutions of a new type for intermediating between the
l
conflicting demands of these established orders. As part of this effort to 
control the externalities of the three classical orders, advanced 
industrialized societies have rediscovered and begun to revive a fourth, 
additional basis of order, associations and organizational concertation. This 
development has not been guided by some recognizable, over-arching principle 
or justified by any conpnehensive ideology. It rather consists of disparate, 
uneven and pragmatic responses to particular dysfunctions and conflicts. The 
emerging pattern is, therefore, confused and tentative, and it is not at all 
clear whether it will in fact consolidate itself, or whether it will turn out 
to be no more than an ad hoc, temporary and contingent set of "mixed" 
responses to ephemeral crises and events. In the following, we wall try to 





























































































AN ASSOCIATIVE MODEL OF SOCIAL ORDER
The idea of a distinctive associative order is not new to modem social 
and political thought. Hegel, for exanple, had an elaborate, if not 
particularly accessible, conception of how Korporationen emerged from civil 
society as its highest organized expression and laid the basis (the second 
"sittliche Wurzel", alongside the family) for "the universal, substantial 
state". He was followed by Fichte, Schlegel, von Ketteler, von Vogelsang, La 
Tour du Pin, de Mun, von Gierke, Spann and others— all of whom advocated some 
form of corporative-organic social order as a response to the "anomic" 
structure of the emerging market. With Rerum Novarum (1891) and Quadragesimo 
Anno (1931), this became an integral part of Roman Catholic doctrine. Ch a 
more secular note, Saint-Simon was promoting the idea of "associationnisme", 
as early as the 1830s, as an alternative to capitalism. Even more important, 
perhaps, was Durkheim with his concept of professional corporations as the 
main institutional basis of "organic solidarity" in modem societies 
characterized by a highly developed division of labour. Indirectly, these 
models inspired contenporary institutions such as Mitbestinrnung, Autogestion, 
etc., and have prepared an ideological basis, often via Social Democracy, for 
the growing importance of associations and organizational concertation.
Of course, the fact of a distinctive associative order has always been 
on historical display, so-to-speak, in the experience of the late medieval 
cities of Italy, France, Catalonia, the Rhineland and Northern Europe whose 
social and political system was based on a guild structure. Hence, when John 
Maynard Keynes reflected on the consequences of "The End of Laissez-Faire" and 
searched for a new order "somewhere between the individual and the modem 
state", he naturally looked backward to those experiences and proposed "a 




























































































Let us follow Lord Keynes' suggestion and see what such a neo-medieval order 
might look like if it were to emerge in the contemporary world.
At its core is a distinctive principle of interaction and allocation 
among a privileged set of actors. The key actors are (Table II) organizations 
defined by their common purpose of defending and promoting functionally- 
defined interests, i.e. class, sectoral and professional associations. The 
central principle is that of concertation, or negotiation within and among a 
limited and fixed set of interest organizations that mutually recognize each 
other's status and entitlements and that are capable of reaching and 
implementing relatively stable compromises (pacts) in the pursuit of their 
interests. A corporative-associative order is, therefore, based primarily on 
interaction within and between interdependent complex organizations. 
Secondary interactions involve the relations between these associations and 
their members (including non-members directly affected by the agreements 
reached) and their interlocutors— outside actors whose resources or support 
are necessary for the concerted compromise to take effect (often, state 
agencies), and/or whose interests are indirectly affected by the externalities 
generated by such agreements (e.g. political parties and social movements).
It is when we turn to "enabling conditions", that the distinctiveness of 
corporative-associative action becomes most manifest, especially in contrast 
to pluralist theories of pressure: politics. For some time, the predominant 
way of analyzing associative collective action relied on an uneasy amalgam of
community and market models. According to it, "interest groups" sprung into
x Vs<
existence "naturally" and acted autonomously on the basis of a unity of shared
norms and interest definitions— both communitarian assumptions. They
attracted members on a voluntary basis, formed into multiple, overlapping
units, entered into shifting "parallelograms of group forces" according to the
issue at hand, used whatever means tended to produce the best immediate




























































































TABLE II: THE PROPERTIES OF AN ASSOCIATIVE MODEL OF SOCIAL ORDER
1 Guiding PRINCIPLE of Interaction and 
Allocation
2 Predominant, modal. COLLECTIVE ACTOR 
Other ACTORS
3. Enabling CONDITIONS
for actor entry and inclusion
4. Principal MEDIUM OF EXCHANGE
5. Principal PRODUCT CF EXCHANGE
6. Predominant RESOURCE(S)
7. Principal MOTIVE(S) of superordinate actors
Principal MOT^IVE(S) of subordinate actors 
Common MOTIVE/CALCULOS
a. Principal DECISION RULE(S)
9. Modal TYPE OF GOODS produced and 
distributed
10 Principal LINES OF CLEAVAGE 
Other CLEAVAGES
11. Predoeiinant NORMATIVE-LEGAL FOUNDATION 
12 Principal PAY-OFF(S)
Intel—  and Intra-organiiationa1 concertation
Functionality defined interest associations.
Members (firms, consortia, individuals, social 
groupings). Interlocutors (state agencies, 
parties, movements)
Capacitg for mutual disruption. Attainment 
of monopoly status. Willingness and capacity 
to compromise. Symmetry of organiiationa1 
capac i ty
Mutual recognition of status and entitlements; 
Compliance of memaers 
Pac ts
Guaranteed access. Compulsory contribution and 
membership. Institutionalized forums of repres­
entation. Centra 1ilation. Comprehensive scope. 
Jurisdiction and Control over member behaviour. 
Delegated tasks. Inter-organizational trust
Expansion of organizationa1 role. Crganizationa1 
development. Career advancement 
Lessened uncertainty. Proportional shares. 
"Satisficing (mini-maxing) interests"
Parity Representation. Proportional 
adjustment. Concurrent consent
Categoric goods
Members vs. Associationa1 Leaders vs.
(State) Interlocutors
Included vs. Excluded (social movements)
Well organized vs. Less uell organized
Established vs. Rival Associations
Over vs. Under-represented
Majority vs. Minority Segments
National vs. Regional vs. Local Interests
(parties, maverick enterprises, community
representatives, local notables)
Pacta sunt servanda. Freedom of association
Less class exp 1 o 1 tat 1oni More symmetric distri­
bution of benefits) Greater predictability and 




























































































preferences and the magnitude of their resources— all characteristics of 
market-like relations. The neo-corporatist paradigm which emerged in European 
political science in the mid-1970s attacked these assumptions head-on. First, 
the assault was made largely on descriptive grounds, showing that the 
assumptions of "pluralism" did not fit recent empirical developments in the 
politics of advanced industrial/capitalist societies. Only later, after much 
conceptual speculation and empirical enquiry, there emerged a growing 
conviction that the conditions which enable interest associations to enter and 
be included in certain influence games are so specific, and the rules of these 
games so distinctive, that they constitute a separate logic of collective 
action and social order.
In a first approximation, this logic can be characterized as follows. 
In a corimunity order, actor preferences and choices are interdependent based
on shared norms and jointly produced satisfaction. In a market order, the 
actions of corrpetitors are supposed to be independent since no one singular 
action can have a determinant and predictable impact upon the eventual 
allocation of satisfactions. In a state order, the actors are dependent upon 
hierarchical coordination which makes their choices heteronomously determined 
and asymmetrically predictable according to the structure of legitimate 
authority and coercive capability. In a corporative-associative order, actors 
are contingently or strategically interdependent in the sense that actions of 
organized collectivities can have a predictable and determinant effect 
(positive or negative) cn the satisfaction of other collectivities' interests, 
and this induces them to search for relatively stable pacts. To reach this 
stage, the contracting interest associations have to have attained some degree 
of syrmetry in their respective resources, especially in their capability for 
representing the interests and controlling the behavior of their members (and 
where necessary outside mavericks), and an effective monopoly in their status 




























































































interest associations are fragmented into rival communities, organized into 
overlapping, competing markets for members and/or resources, completely 
dependent upon voluntary member support, or manipulated from above by state 
authority, the enabling conditions for corporative-associative order do not 
exist.
The medium or "currency" of the associative model consists predominantly 
of mutual recognition of status and entitlements. Of course, concerted groups 
may bring to bear on a given issue customary solidarities, monetary resources, 
bloc votes and even threats of coercion should the negotiative process break 
down, but, fundamentally, they are making demands on each other— informing 
each other about the magnitude and intensity of their preferences and their 
likely courses of action if agreement is not reached— and offering in return 
for the satisfaction of these interests to deliver the compliance of their 
members. This scambio politico, to use an expression which has gained 
considerable currency in Italy, obviously depends on whether the minimal, 
enabling conditions have been met, but its efficacy is greatly enhanced if, as 
the result of iterative efforts at concertation, the participating 
associations have acquired new resources. Many of those listed under this 
rubrique in Table II: guaranteed access, compulsory membership and/or 
contributions, institutionalized forums of representation, centralized 
coordination, comprehensive scope, jurisdiction and control over member 
behavior aid delegated tasks of policy implementation depend crucially on the 
response of one key interlocutor, namely the state, which must be willing and 
able to use its key resource: legitimate control over coercion and 
authoritative distribution of positions, to promote and/or protect such 
developments. The "motivational structure" of corporative associability is, 
perhaps, not as distinctive as many of its other attributes, at least for 
superordinate actors. Like their confreres in state agencies, their motives 




























































































context within which they operate and from which they draw their resources. 
At the center of these are desires for organizational development, expansion, 
stability and strategic autonomy (Schmitter and Streeck 1981). Eventually, 
this should lead to a professionalization of management within interacting 
associations and a consequent decline in their dependence on voluntary support 
and elected leadership.
The motives of subordinate actors (i.e. members) are more difficult to 
discern since they are obviously being forced to give up what may often be 
opportunistically attractive possibilities for acting individually or through 
less formal groups, in exchange for accepting to be bound by compromised, 
longer-term and mon ■ general obligations negotiated for them by their 
respective class, sectoral or professional associations. This may be less of 
a problem for categories of interest where individual actors are very weak and 
dispersed (e.g. fanners, workers, petty bourgeois), but could pose a serious 
challenge in those categories where "going-it-alone" through market power or 
state influence is a promising alternative (e.g. capitalists and some 
privileged professions). Presumably, what motivates a subordinate to conform 
to associationally negotiated pacts is lesser uncertainty about aggregate 
outcomes and higher assurance of receiving a proportionally more "equitable" 
share of whatever is disputed. If one adds to these the probability that 
certain conditions of macro-societal performance (e.g. in terms of inflation, 
unemployment and strike rates) will be superior in societies whose markets 
have been "tamed" by associative action, then we have tin even greater reason 
for understanding member conformity. Basically what seems to happen is a 
shift in the "rationality" of social choice. In comnunities, the calculus 
rests on "satisfying identity", in markets, economic or political, on 
"maximizing advantage "/building "minimum winning coalitions", in states on 
"minimizing risk" and "maximizing predictability". What associations in a 




























































































given the structural conplexity and informational overload of modem society, 
namely "satisficing interests". By deliberate mutual adjustment and repeated 
interaction, these coriprehensive, monopolistically privileged actors avoid the 
temptation to exploit momentary advantages to the maximum, and the pitfall of 
landing in the worst possible situation. In short, they avoid the prisoner's 
dilemma through inter-organizational trust backed by what ve shall call below 
"private interest government". Ihe price for this is a lengthy deliberation 
process and a series of "second-best" compromised solutions which are often 
difficult to justify on aesthetic or normative grounds.
Communities decide by unanimous consent, markets by consumer or majority 
preference, states by authoritative adjudication and imperative certification. 
Corporative associations decide by highly complicated formulae which start 
with parity representation (regardless of members or functional clout), work 
through a process of sequential proportional adjustments based either on 
"splitting-the-difference" or "package-dealing" arrangements, and then ratify 
the final pact by concurrent consent. All this takes time and is vulnerable 
to substantive and normative assaults coming from communitarian, market and 
state sources. Usually, deliberations are kept informal and secretive in an 
effort to insulate them as much as possible from outside pressures or from 
dissidents within the associational ranks. The "weighting" of influences and 
the consequent calculation of proportional justice or equity involve often 
arbitrary standards and mysterious processes— nothing like the neat decision 
rules of solidaristic unanimity, consumer sovereignty, minimal winning 
majority or authoritative decree characteristic of the other orders. Ihese 
elements of citizen unaccountability and proportional inequality— combined 
with the unavoidably compromised nature of the decisions made— can create a 
rather serious "legitimacy deficit" and expose corporative-associative 
structures to normative challenges by proponents of the competing orders of 




























































































Hie final structural element we need to discuss in this exploratory 
description of an ideal-typical associative social order is its lines of 
cleavage. Here, the principal configuration is tripolar rather than bipolar 
as in the three other orders. Associational leaders find themselves, Janus- 
like, in conflict with their members on one side and their (state) 
interlocutors on the other. While the behavior and the interests of the 
members are strongly conditioned by competitive market forces, state officials 
are primarily concerned with upholding and advancing the hierarchical 
coordinative capacities and the bureaucratic jurisdiction of the state. This 
does not necessarily leave those in the middle with much room for manoeuvre. 
Either economic market forces may prove too strong to be contained by 
associational compromise; or electoral competition may bring to power parties 
representing "true" citizen interests which will dismantle associational rule; 
or state officials, wary of excessive devolution of "their" authority to 
associations they cannot fully control, will simply outlaw them (not to 
mention the fact that, in some countries, courts may declare associational 
pacts illegal under the Constitution or anti-trust laws). It may only be a 
question of which of these gets sufficiently aroused first: opportunistic 
capitalists, radically mobilized workers, outraged voters, offended civil 
servants (or strict constructionist judges). In addition, the corporative- 
associative order also has a number of secondary cleavages to cope with, not 
the least of which is that between those interests which are organized into it 





























































































PUBLIC POLICY AND H E  ASSOCIATIVE MODEL OF SOCIAL ORDER. THE CONCEPT OF 
"PRIVATE INTEREST GOVERNMENT".
Although it is possible to construct a model of an associative order 
that possesses a certain internal logic, a rather complete set of attributes 
and a vague correspondence to possible solutions to some of the functional 
problems in the interstices between community, market and state in advanced 
industrial/capitalist societies, this by itself says nothing about its 
presence and relative inportance in social and political reality. Making such
as assunption would be to compound a rationalist with a functionalist fallacy.^  - --
There is, however, a large and growing body of research on the contribution of 
associational structures to social order, often but by no means exclusively 
guided by theories of "neo-corporatism" (Schmitter 1974, 1977) (4). The 
lively interest winch this concept has stimulated among social scientists may 
in itself be an indication that the associative mode of social order has 
gained, or is gaining, in inportance. Moreover, it seems that many of the 
present political controversies in Western industrialized countries can be 
described, and better understood, in terms of a search for a new balance, not 
just between community, market and state, but also between these three and a 
growing realm of associative action.
In the past four decades, the politics of many Western countries seem to 
have been bound up in a continuous oscillation between state interventionism 
on the one hand and market liberalism on the other. Today, after the "long 
wave" of increasing state interventionism in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
the limits and dysfunctions of public bureaucratic regulation have again 
become a major issue for both the political right and the political left. 
Catchwords such as "de-regulation", "de-bureaucratization", "Entstaatlichung" , 
"Staatsentlastung", etc. have come to figure prominently in political 




























































































the state center on a return to either the market or the corrmunity as sources 
of social order. While it is the reinstatement of the market that is at the 
core of the demands of the powerful neo-liberal movement, off-loading the 
welfare state to voluntary community action is by no means incompatible with 
neo-liberal values. Greater reliance on "community" is also advocated by a 
v/ide range of other groups— from adherents to the Catholic doctrine of 
"subsidiarity", to various "autonomous" and "alternative" social movements 
that have otherwise little in common with neo-liberalism and that in 
particular would not w;int to ally themselves with its call for "more market".
However, for all its powerful influence on the public mind, the widely 
accepted antinomy of state vs. market/community appears to be insufficiently 
complex for both analytical and practical purposes. For one thing, the swing 
of the pendulum of public policy seems to be different in different countries, 
with some countries being much less t o m  between the two extremes than others. 
As if happens, these countries tend to be those that have relatively strong 
institutions, often described as "neo-corporatist", of associational and 
inter-associational conflict regulation— e.g. Austria, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, West Germany. Institutions of this kind, in addition to 
"mediating" between the state and the market, seem to limit the extent to 
which the two can invade each other and enlarge their domain at each other's 
expense. In this way, they seemi to inject an element of stability in their 
respective polities that makes them less subject to changing political 
fashions. Aim, an ol;iborat.e intermediary assoc i at. ional structure seems to 
enlarge a country's repertoire of policy alternatives— its "requisite 
variety"— and this may enable such countries to respond to new problems 
without having to undergo dramatic internal realignments.
From the viewpoint of public policy, neo-corporatism amounts to an 
attempt to assign to interest associations a distinct role between the state 




























































































type of social order that associations can generate and embody. As an 
alternative to direct state intervention and regulation, the "public use of 
private organized interests" takes the form of the establishment, under state 
licence and assistance, of "private interest governments" with devolved public 
responsibilites— of agencies of regulated self-regulation of social groups 
with special interests that are made subservient to general interests by 
appropriately designed institutions. The specificity of this strategy lies, 
above all, in the kind of interests on which it is based, and in the way in 
which they are treated. This becomes clearer when one compares it to the two 
alternative strategies of Staatsentlastung. The neo-liberal restauration of 
the market aims essentially at the liberation of individual self-interests 
from bureaucratic-regulatory constraints. It is based on the assumption that 
individuals act most rationally if they are free to pursue their interests as 
they see fit, and that in the end, this will benefit everybody. Devolving * 
state functions to the community amounts to an attempt to marshall collective 
other-regarding interests for social purposes; its underlying premise is that 
people hold solidaristic values and cormiunitarian identities that, just as 
their self-interests, can contribute to social order directly and without 
state coordination. Both premises may or may not be correct. What they have 
in corrmon is that they draw on widely accepted assumptions about thej 
motivation and behavior of individuals. By contrast, the corporative- 
associative delegation of public policy functions to private interest
government.:; represent.:.; an atteiipt. to utilize the collective self—interest of 
social groups to create and maintain a generally acceptable social order, and 
it is based on assumptions about the behavior of organizations as transforming 
agents of individual interests. This makes the idea of responsible
associative governance inevitably more abstract and remote from everyday 
experience than both the neo-liberal appeal to individual self-interest and 




























































































conplexity and, indeed, counterintuitiveness of the idea that organized 
special interests could be turned into promoters of the public interest— seems 
to lie one explanation for the lack of public attention that it has so far 
received.
"Private government" is a concept that has had some currency in the 
social sciences, and a short definitional excursus may be appropriate. 
Firstly, the term has been applied to an extremely wide range of phenomena, 
from subjudicial legal dispute settlement to the Irish Republican Army 
/ (Macaulay 1983), large business corporations (McConnell 1966, Buxbaum 1982) 
and/or their top management (Bauer and Cohen 1983), the professions (Gilb 
1966), the universities (Lakoff and Rich 1973), all kinds of para-state 
agencies, quangoes, community welfare organizations (ihonpson 1983) etc., etc. 
In this article, we speak of "private interest government" to enphasize that 
we are exclusively concerned with the self-"government" of categories of 
social actors defined by a.collective self-regarding interest. Secondly, the 
concept to "private government" is often associated with the notion of an 
illegitimate use of power (Lowi 1979), for example when Bauer and Cohen (1981) 
define "private governments" by their capacity to preempt and frustrate public 
(industrial) policy. For our part, we prefer to reserve the concept for 
arrangements under which an attempt is made to make associative, self- 
interested collective action contribute to the achievement of public policy 
objectives. In generic terms, this is the case where it is in the interest of 
an organized group to strive for a "categoric good" which is partially 
compatible or identical with a "collective good" for the society as a whole. 
We maintain that such conpatibility or identity may be more frequent than is 
commonly held (4). We also maintain that the extent to which categoric and 
collective goods overlap depends, within limits, on two factors: on the way in 
which group interests are organized into associative structures and 




























































































interests and the state— i.e. between the governments of private and public 
interests.
The following sections of this paper will focus successively on three 
selected aspects of the phenomenon of "private interest government"— a 
genetic, a functional and a structural one. Since the genesis of private 
interest government can in an important sense be conceived of as a process of 
organizational change, the first part of the discussion will be devoted to the 
possible contribution of organization theory to an improved understanding of 
an associative social order. Secondly, in functional terms, we will briefly 
outline in what sense we think private interest government may contribute to 
the functioning and, hence, compensate for the deficiencies of community 
action, market competition, ;tnd state intervention. Finally, concerning the 
structure of private interest government, we want to point out the essential 
role played within it by elements of spontaneous solidarity, dispersed 
competition, and hierarchical control.
THE ORGANIZATIOriAL DYNAMICS OF PRIVATE INTEREST GOVERNMENTS
Private governance in a corporative-associative order is based on group 
self-interest. Tt is the result of an organizational dynamic by which
pluralist interest representation is transformed into neo-corporatist interest 
intermediation. This dynamic can, we suggest, be analysed in three
dimensions: the relationship between organizations and interests; the role of
public status in the shaping of interest organizational structures and
functions; and the impact of political-organizational design. In each of 
these dimensions, the phenomenon of private government poses difficult





























































































(1) Organizations and Interests. Mainstream organizational theory has 
tended to treat interest associations with caution. It has preferred to deal 
with "harder", more formalized, types of organizations coming from the more 
established orders of the market and the state: business firms, public 
agencies, hospitals, prisons, or military units— whose boundaries are easier 
to define, whose centers of decision-making are easier to locate, and whose 
performance is easier to assess against an imputed standard of instrumental 
rationality. Where interest associations have been studied, they have been 
conceptualized in the pluralist tradition as "voluntary organizations" 
catering to, and exclusively dependent upon, the perceived interests of a 
given constituency. Tendencies toward organizational autonomy from members' 
interest perceptions have generally been regarded as a perversion of 
"organizational democracy" and have been interpreted, very much in the 
Michelsian tradition, as oligarchic "goal displacement" under the influence of 
a "dominant coalition" of power-wielding functionaries.
The negligent treatment of interest associations in organization theory 
seems less that adequate when confronted with the empirical reality of 
interest group self-regulation. The important present and potential role of 
intermediary associations for public policy implementation (Mayntz 1983) makes 
it costly for a discipline that has a significant contribution to make to 
implementation theory, to pay so much more attention to public bureaucracies 
than, say, to business associations— especially in a time when, thanks not 
least. to organization research, the deficiencies of state-bureaucratic 
regulation have become so obvious. The more public policies are, actually or 
potentially, administered through private-public interfaces and organizational 
networks, the smaller becomes the share of reality that is accessible to an 





























































































Another apparent shortcoming of organization theory is its reluctance to
corporatist intermediaries, in addition to being mechanisms of policy 
implementation (Lehmbruch 1977), are also in a very specific sense producers 
of group interests. Contrary to their dominant image as "voluntary 
organizations", they are much more than passive recipients of preferences put 
forward by their constituents and clients. Empirical observations of neo- 
corporatist practice, as well as theoretical reasoning, show that organized 
group interests are not given but emerge as a result of a multifaceted 
interaction between social and organizational structure— whereby the substance 
of the collective interest depends at least as much on the way it is 
organized, as docs the structure of the organization on the interest it is to. 
represent. This interactive relationship is only partly described as one of 
organizational goal formation; at the same time, it is one of collective 
identity formation (Pizzomo 1978) shaped and constrained by established, 
licensed, "oligopolistic" (or even monopolistic) organizational structures. 
Oligarchic staff interests undoubtedly are one of the factors that affect the 
outcome, but more important seem to be the properties of an association as 
such— its domain, its structure, its resources— which determine the 
institutional context within which group interests and identities are defined 
and continuously revised. This essentially political view of organizational 
structure goes beyond traditional concepts of organization centering on the 
notion of efficiency and effectiveness) just as it transcends objectivistic 
concepts of interest which postulate their existence outside and apart from 
their organization. Hie empirical phenomenon of private governance, just as 
it requires political science to take more seriously the notion of organized 
interests, seems to require organizational analysis to come to better terms 
with the politics of interests.




























































































(2) Organizations and Public Status, The organizational transformation 
of "pluralist" pressure groups into private interest governments is an 
essentially political process that is based on both bargaining between group
interests and the state, and on the (potential or actual) use of state
A
authority. A typical "path" by which organized interests move into positions 
of incorporation and authority begins with disputes between interest groups 
and state agencies on the necessity and the terms of authoritative state 
intervention into group members' behavior. In many such cases, the mere 
presence of a state powerful enough, and willing, to establish direct control 
adds to the already defined interests of organized collectivities an 
additional and distinctive interest in preventing that control. This
additional interest can be so strong that groups may be prepared to compromise 
on their substantive interests if this can save them from regulatory state 
interference. State agencies, on the other hand, are often prepared to accept 
"voluntary" collective self-regulation as an alternative to authoritative 
state regulation even if this implies certain substantive concessions and a 
losfe of (direct) control on their part. What the state loser; in this respect, 
it can hope to recover through lower implementation costs and higher 
inplementation effectiveness. No be; that the substantive and procedural 
bargaining between the state and organized interests that may give rise to 
private interest governments would be impossible without the "Damocles sword" 
of threatened direct state Intervention. Pluralist pressure politicos that 
result in "agency capture" remove this sword or make it ineffective, and it is 
here— in the strength and continuing relative autonomy of the state— that 
private interest government differs most strongly from what Lowi has called
"sponsored pluralism" (1979, 60).
As a result of their assumption of self-disciplinary responsibilities as 
private interest governments, interest associations can come to develop a 




























































































under the concept of "political status". (Offe 1981). This involves much more 
than just a right to be consulted . by the government on legislation. 
Essentially, it means sharing in the state's authority to make and enforce 
binding decisions. The delegation of such authority to an association in the 
course of its transformation into a self-regulating agency will normally be 
reflected in its structure. But private interest governments may also rely on 
enforcement mechanisms with which they maintain no formal connection 
whatsoever— consider, for example, an ostensibly "voluntary" standardization 
agency whose norms are used by the courts in rulings on liability. The 
peculiar facilitative role of the state with respect to private interest 
government— vhich typically is highly indirect, subtle and unobtrusive 
(Streeck 1979; Streeck et al. 1981)— does not seem to be adequately captured 
in terms of a relationship between the association and one environment among 
others. "Public status" refers to the, direct or indirect, acquisition of a 
unique resource that no other environment but the state has to offer: the 
ability to rely on legitimate coercion. Organization theory tends to be 
"state-free" in the sense th.it it does not. systematically recognize this 
crucial distinction (Hughes 1983)— crucial, in any case, for understanding the 
emergence of a corporative-associative order. It appears that, in the same 
way as organization theory may have to incorporate a politial and politicized 
concept of interest, the reality of modem interest organization confronts it 
with the need to involve itself more closely with theories of the state.
(3) Organizations and Political-Organizational Design. The emergence 
of private governments out of pluralist interest representation can in part be 
reconstructed as the product of direct or indirect, often disintegrated and 
policy-specific, attempts by state agencies at "political design" (Anderson- 
1977). State political design of organized private interests is aimed at both 
the structure of associations a s . processors of group interests, and their 
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responsive to general or public interests. Withdrawal by the state from 
direct regulation in favor of "procedurally" (Mayntz 1983) regulated, self- 
interested self-regulation, if it is not to result in a loss of public 
accountability, requires the protection and/or creation of corporative- 
associative actors and policy-making arrangements that, by their inherent 
institutional dynamics, arrive at interest definitions that are, at least in 
part, compatible with the objectives of public policy— i.e. that produce, in 
the pursuit of "categoric goods", "public goods" for the society as a whole 
(cf. Teubner 1978). Otherwise, what may have been intended as a devolution of 
public responsibility to private group interests will «id up as a pluralist 
"colonization" of the state by the very interests that were to be subjected to 
public discipline.
Organization theory and research have a crucial contribution to make to 
the political design of responsible interest intermediaries. For example, a 
central problem of public control over self-regulating groups is to make 
organized groups internalize as much as possible the costs of their self- 
interested behavior' for other interests. This can be achieved either by the 
facilitation of "enconpassing organization" (Olson 1965) which includes and, 
there fore, balances internally a wide variety of interests (intra- 
organizational concertation), or by setting up arrangements for bargaining 
between a spectrum of narrower organizations mandated with reaching mutual 
agreement: (inter-org.nizational concertation). Political design, then, seems 
to liave : jot.*: 'leg n o  of cl mice between intra- and inter-organizational 
relations as politically privileged structures for publicly responsible 
interest accomodation. What is, in a given case, the adequate mixture between 
the two? To what extent are they functionally equivalent? How much interest 
diversity can be brought together inder the roof of one comprehensive 
organization? How do the results of intra-organizational interest negotiation 




























































































underlying group interests? And what are the limits, and the possible 
unintended side-effects, of the authoritative structuring of, and the award of 
public status to, organized interest groups in a democratic society? The 
political theory of neo-corporatism has only begun to address these questions; 
it will have to absorb much more thoroughly the lessons of organization theory 
if it is to advance in this difficult territory.
THE FUNCTIONAL ADVANTAGES OF PRIVATE INTEREST GOVERNMENT
"Regulated self-regulation" by organized interests seems to be capable 
of solving a number of problems that have been found to be associated with 
either state intervention, market competition, or voluntary community action. 
As far as the state is concerned, two specific deficiencies stand out as of 
particular importance. One is tire limits of legal regulation, especially in 
terms of the implementation of regulatory programs (Luhman 1981, Teubner 1983, 
Voigt 1983, Willke 1983). Private interest government provides for a peculiar 
amalgamation of policy formation on the one hand and policy implementation on 
the other, within one and the same organizational structure (Lehmbruch 1977). 
The same associations that negotiate the terms of regulation of their 
members' behavior, are charged as private governments with responsibility to 
enforce them. As a result, not only do considerations of enforceability enter 
directly into the process of policy formation (on the importance of this, see 
Mayntz 1983), but the agents of implementation— the professional staff and the 
officials of the association— are closer to the target group (their members) 
than state bureaucracies, and they have more intimate knowledge of its 
situation and concerns. It is likely that this enables them to apply rules 





























































































better into account— which, in turn, tends to increase the acceptance of 
regulation by those affected by it (Streeck 1983a).
Another problem with state hierarchic coordination is that it has always 
V been associated with specific difficulties of legitimation (Offe 1975). These 
are basically of two kinds: one involves winning the support and the
cooperation of groups that are asked to sacrifice some of their interests in 
favor of general interests; the other involves presenting a consistent image 
of the societal role and the "jurisdiction" of legitimate state intervention 
as such— in other words, a normative definition of the "boundaries" of the 
modem state. Private interest government, by providing for a close 
institutionalized interface between public authorities and specific groups in 
civil society, can make a significant contribution to the solution of both
kinds of problems. By turning behavioral regulation into a matter of the
organized self-interest of affected groups, it leaves the legitimation of 
regulatory interference to group representatives who, instead of having to 
call upon general, society-wide Vcdues and obligations, can have recourse to 
more tangible group-specific norm:; and interest perceptions. The most well- 
known, but by no means the only, example is that of the leaders of a trade 
union and a business association who defend an industrial agreement as viable 
and equitable to their respective constituents, with each side using very
different arguments and appealing to very different common values. This
differentiation of legitimation by conflicting social interests relieves the 
public government, of the need to develop a generally acceptable political 
formula to defend allocational decisions. It amounts to the utilization, for 
the purpose of creating public order, of divergent interest perceptions whose 
ideological integration is difficult or inpossible.
Secondly, the notion of collective responsibility of interest 
organizations for controlling their members in the public interest can serve 




























































































Here, one comes close to traditional ideas of the state being only 
"subsidiary" to society— in the sense that it should content itself with 
assisting smaller collectivities to help themselves, and intervene directly 
only if such self-help has turned out to be impossible. Of course, Catholic 
social doctrine, with its underlying concept of "natural law" and its organic, 
collectivistic image of society, cannot really provide a normative 
justification for today's secular corporative-associative structures and 
practices. The most effective legitimation for a withdrawal of the modem 
state from substantive regulation to the "procedural" regulation of collective 
actors (Mayntz 1983) is likely to come from accumulated negative experiences 
with étatiste modes of policy-making— i.e. is pragmatically and empirically 
rather than normat.ively based. One implication of this is that, however 
inportant the use of private associability for public policy purposes may be 
or become, it will consist of a series of pragmatic adjustments within the 
existing ("liberal", "democratic", "capitalist") system of government, not in 
the latter's wholesale replacement with an "associative" or "corporatist" 
system (Olsen 1901).
Concerning markets, their obvious and often analysed problem is that the 
unregulated interaction of self-interested parties may fail to produce certain 
collective or categoric goods which are a necessary precondition for an 
effective functioning of the market ("market failure"). In such cases, the 
rational behavior of market participants needs to be subjected to some form of 
authorilaLive control— exercised either by the state or by some other agent—  
to prevent it from becoming self-destructive. Furthermore, free competition 
may result in social cleavages and inequalities that give rise in turn to 
"pluralist" collective action aimed at "distorting" the market. 
"Factionalism" of this kind is not easy to suppress in a democratic society; a 
state that would try to do so would have to be so autonomous that it would in 




























































































political democracy are indeed ultimately incompatible, as lias been argued by 
observers from both the right (von Hayek 1976-78) and the left (Goldthorpe 
1983). ihe neo-corporatist transformation of pluralist interest groups into 
publicly responsible self-regulating bodies can be seen, from this 
perspective, as an attempt not only to provide for the production of 
categoric/collective goods by other, and more effective, means than state 
regulation; it is also an attempt to impose discipline on the inevitable 
factions that arise in a democratic polity combined with a market economy, 
and, thereby, to make organized interest politics more compatible with the 
requirements of the market.
Finally, the Achilles heel of community action is that it lacks 
authoritative means to mobilize resources above and beyond what can be 
obtained on a voluntary basis. This is a problem that is particularly 
relevant the less normatively integrated communities are, and there is reason 
to believe that with increasing mobility of individuals and cultural 
identities, the sense of altruistic obligation— of "other-regardingness"— has 
tended to become weaker in most social groups. In fact, this is precisely the 
rationale behind the modem transfer of traditional community welfare 
functions to a growing "welfare state". Moreover, communities can be 
parochial in that their values and accepted mutual obligations may be at odds 
with the values and requirements of society at large. The backing by public 
authority of strong intermediary organizations representing specific social 
group:; may offer a way of increasing the latter's self-regulating capacity 
beyond the limits of voluntarism, ;and of guiding their collective behavior in 
accordance with general rather than exclusively group-specific values and 
interests.
Interest associations that have been transformed into private interest 
governments compensate for a number of specific state, market and community 




























































































equipped to solve, they not only do not preempt them but in fact contribute to 
their respective functioning. A state that withdraws, in selected areas, from
f
direct to procedural control does not become as weak state; in terms of the 
effectiveness of its policies, it may in fact gain in strength. Similarly, 
markets in order to be efficient mechanisms of allocation need to be protected 
from distortion by pluralist interest politics, and they require regulatory 
constraints on conpetitive behavior as a precondition of stable, long term 
exchange and co:npetition (e.g. in areas like technical standardization or 
vocational training). Finally, conmunities in a society with a strong state 
and a free market can better preserve their cultural identities and bring them 
to bear on the political process if they are effectively organized so as to 
command more and other resources than those that modem communities can 
generate on their own.
PRIVATE INTEREST GOVERNMENT AS A "MIXED MODE" OF POLICY-MAKING
It is important to emphasize that the state is not absent in the 
associational mode of social order, and nor is the market or the community. 
Corporative-associative order emerges in thoroughly "mixed" polities. 
Typically, institutions of private interest governance are geared to selected 
sectors, industries and policy areas— with other collectivities and issues 
bring directly governed by the state, l e f t  lx) I.Ik; Forces of the market, or 
taken care of by community action. Moreover, community, market and state 
constitute inportant limiting and facilitating conditions for and inside any 
given associative arrangement, and without them such arrangements could not 
exist and function. While we believe that the same can be said, respectively, 




























































































exclusively on private interest governments and their relationship to the 
three others.
State. Interest associations can usually govern the interests of their 
members only with some kind of state facilitation and authorization. At the 
very least, private interest government requires an Ordungspolitik of 
deliberate abstention from interference with the exercise of authority by 
powerful associations over their members. Where the state strictly upholds 
the right of individuals not to be organized and not to be subject to any 
coercion other than that exercised by the state itself, a corporative- 
associative order cannot exist. As a rule, however, mere abstention is not 
enough. Ihe power of associations to govern does not normally arise 
spontaneously from the process of civil associability. To turn into private 
interest governments, associations need to be supplied with more and stronger 
.authority than they can possibly mobilize by themselves on a voluntary basis. 
In fact, the limits to autonomous mobilization of authority, just as of other 
resources such as money, organizational stability and effective recognition, 
are an important reason why associations are often prepared to trade some of 
their members' interests against public status when it is offered to them by 
the state (Streeck 1982). State facilitation of organizational development 
and the institutionalization of interest associations can take a wide variety 
of forms, and usually they are much less conspicuous than in a country like 
Austria where then is compulsory organization of industry, commerce, 
agriculture and labour in their respective Chambers.
An active role of the state is necessary in yet another respect. Che 
important mechanism by which private interest governments are kept responsive 
to wider societal needs is the threat by the state to intervene directly if 
the group fails to adjust the behavior of its members to the public interest. 
In this sense, the public use of private organized interests requires a strong 




























































































a devolution of state functions to interest intermediaries. But this has to 
be accompanied by a simultaneous acquisition by the state of a capacity to 
design, monitor, and keep in check the new self-regulating systems 
("procedural control", Mayntz 1983). Moreover, reliance on associative self­
regulation in specific cases and at a given time must not undermine the 
state's general capacity to resort to direct regulation if it so decides; 
otherwise, an important source of strength for the state in bargaining with 
organized interests over their acceptance of obligations to the society as a 
whole disappears. It is only to the extent that the state— by a corrtoination 
of procedural, instead of substantive, regulation with a credible threat of 
direct intervention— can hold private governments at least partially 
accountable to the public, that the associative-corporative mode of social 
order can become a legitimate alternative to communitarianism, étatisme and 
market liberalism.
Market. Private governments do not per se eliminate competition. In 
all Western countries, legal rules about "restraint of trade" impose limits on 
associations interfering with the market. In principle at least, the subjects 
of private governments remain free to engage in contractual relations with 
each other and with members of other groups. Group self-regulation is 
concerned with the non-contractual preconditions, not with the substitution of 
private contracts. It is true that such regulation, just as state regulation, 
often extends to the substantive context of private-law contracts; but it is 
also true, even in the labour market, that there always remains a significant 
area of discretion for individual contracting parties ("wage drift") that is 
protected from associative interference.
The market order continues to be present also in a political sense. The 
emergence of private interest government is closely related to the acquisition 
by formerly "voluntary" interest associations of organizational privileges 




























































































interest-political "monopoly" that is inherent in all such arrangements must, 
however, be seen in perspective. Even associations with compulsory 
membership, such as continental Chambers of Commerce, depend to a significant 
extent on voluntary contributions and voluntary compliance by their members. 
Refusal to participate in associational bodies and to support associational 
policies remains a strong sanction in the hands of the membership. The 
authority of private interest governments to corrpell, even where it is 
strong, is never strong enough to exempt associations completely from the need 
to mobilize, on a voluntary basis and in competition with other institutions 
and collective actors, additional political resources and loyalties. For such 
mobilization to be possible, associational policies, for all their undoubted 
autonony, must be attractive enough to the members to be competitive in the 
political market— a market that, while it may be highly oligopolistic, 
nevertheless remains a market.
Cormvnity. Private interest governments, however much facilitated and 
^institutionalized by state authority, must be rooted in the values and 
interest perceptions of existing social collectivities. The (organized) 
collectivities that are to be drawn into public status cannot be arbitrarily 
created by state decree; they must have some kind of prior, independent 
existence and identity. This does not mean that they have to be intact 
communities; as their organizations acquire further "external" means of 
control through their assumption of public status, their collective capacity 
to act and exercise internal discipline depends not only on normative 
integration. Similarly, the interest perceptions of collectivities that are 
potential subjects of group governance need not by themselves be clear and 
unambiguous enough to guide group collective action; in fact, they may become 
manifest only through authoritative (re-)definition by professional, 
"established" representatives with monopolistic status. Nevertheless, the 




























































































constituents to concerted pacts, must be able to draw on some kind of shared 
norms and collective identity which they cannot create, and the members must 
recognize in the policies of their leaders some reflection of what they 
themselves regard as their interests. Moreover, the value systems supporting 
corporative-associative institutions must include some residual commitment to 
the society at large that goes beyond the boundaries of just one interest 
aggregate. Such commitments— for example, to professional norms of good 
performance or to a group's prestige and respect with other groups— can be, 
and are likely to be, reinforced by organizational efforts to build a 
collective identity; but where they are not even residually present, and where 
community values and identities are exclusively self-regarding and self- 
sufficient, corporative-associative arrangements become extremely tenuous and 
unstable.
CONCLUSION
Private interest government is not about to replace community, market 
and state. Even where a large share of public policy is made by and 
implemented through intermediary associations, these are always to some 
important extent dependent on comnunity values and cohesion, kept in check by 
economic and political market forces, and subject to hierarchical control, 
political design and the pressure of possible direct state intervention. 
Moreover, not all social groups and political issues lend themselves equally 
well to associational self-regulation, and there undoubtedly are social order 
problems in modem societies for which the three competing institutions offer 
more appropriate solutions. Ihe idea of a comprehensive corporative- 
associative social or political "system" is therefore fundamentally 




























































































certain range of policy areas for which institutions of group self-regulation 
rnay produce more socially adjusted and normatively acceptable results than 
either comnunal self-help, free trade, or étatisme. Empirical research and 
theoretical reflection on the preconditions of successful utilization, in a 
"mixed polity", of corporative associability for public policy purposes has 
only begun. Increased efforts in this direction may make it possible to 
employ more consciously an additional mode of ordering social relationships 
that corrpensates for inportant dysfunctions of conrnunity, market and state, 




























































































(1) Actually, it would be more accurate to call it "the Corporative 
Association" since it differs significantly from "the Voluntary 
Association" which preceded it in social and political theory. If the 
concept, "corporation", had not already been appropriated for use to 
describe a particular type of market institution, we would have 
preferred to use that term. We were terrpted to invent a new noun, "the 
Corporative", to replace "the Association", but declined to do so on 
the grounds that there were already too many neo-logisms in this kind 
of field and that it would, in any case, probably be confused with "the 
Corporation" or "the Cooperative".
(2) A similar argument has recently been put forward by Colin Crouch 
(1981), in a paper from which the present one has greatly profitted.
(3) For a more detailed discussion of the legitimation problems of a 
corporative-associative order, see Schmitter 1983.
(4) Part of the relevant literature has been reviewed by Olsen (1981),
under the label of "integrated organizational participation in 
government". Related concepts— of which each stands for another 
unending list of publications— are "para-state government", "public- 
private interface", "quangoes", etc. It is inpossible to cite all or 
most of the studies that have in one w/ay or another influenced the 
ideas presented in this article. A list of recent errpirical studies on 
interest associations as contributors to public policy and social order 
includes: Ackermann (1981) and other research reports from the
Forschungs projekt Parastaatliche Verwaltung at the Eidgenossische 
Technische Hochschule, especially libs, b, '"/, 9, 12 and 13; Atkinson and 
Coleman (1988); boddewyn (1981); Coleman and Jacek (1983); Grant 
(1983a, b); Jacobsson (1983); Ronge (1980); Sargent (1983); Streeck
(1983b); Traxler (1983); de Vroom (1983); van Waarden (1983); Willmott 
(1983). Some of these studies were carried out in the context of a
multi-national research project on "Ihe Organization of Business 
Interests" that is coordinated by the authors (Schmitter and Streeck 
1981).
(5) Ihat it is possible is admitted even by such a formidable critic of
"distributional coalitions" as Mancur Olson: "Occasionally there
are... situations in which the constituents of special-interest 
organizations seek to increase social efficiency because they would get 
a lion's share of the gain in output; this occurs when the special- 
in Lores! organization provides a collective good to its member's that 
increases their production efficiency and also when it gets the 
govemmenL to provide some public good that generates more income than 
costs, yet mainly benefits those in the special-interest group" (Olson 
1982, 46).
(6) Tnis seems to be the central "policy" problem in Mancur Olson's recent 
book, Ihe Rise and Decline of Nations (1982). While Olson demonstrates 
convincingly the allocational superiority of free competition, his 
sophisticated knowledge of interest politics prevents him from siding 
with economists like Milton Friedman in their call for a laissez-faire 
liberal state. Olsen is well aware of the fact that a free market m  
order to remain free, requires continuous, vigourous state 
intervention. He even goes as far as to say that, "the absence of 




























































































be possible anyway, because of the lobbying of special-interest groups, 
unless we fly to the still greater evil of continuous instability" 
(178). But Olson stops still short of explaining what kind of 
interventionist policy he recomnends to goveminents in relation to 
group interests, and how a state would have to look like in order to 
provide politically for "freer trade and fewer impediments to the free 
>K)vernent of factors of production and of firms" (141). Olson does not, 
at least not explicitly, argue in favor of state support and 
facilitation of "conpr^ehensive organization" which for him is no more 
than a second-best solution. Nor does he advocate the abolishment 
through government repression of the democratic freedom of association. 
But he does quote Thomas Jefferson's remark that "the tree of liberty 
must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and 
tyrants" (on p. 141)— the latter clearly being, in the context of 
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